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Living Under the Boot: Police Militarization and 
Peaceful Protest 
Charlotte Guerra* 
But always . . . always there will be the intoxication of power, 
constantly increasing and constantly growing subtler. Always, at 
every moment, there will be the thrill of victory, the sensation of 
trampling on an enemy who is helpless. If you want a picture of the 
future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever.1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BOOT 
In the modern era, it is almost taken for granted that our state and local 
police have increasingly taken on the appearance and mannerisms of an 
occupying force. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
“American policing has become unnecessarily and dangerously 
militarized.”2 Part of this increased militarization has been a combative 
attitude officers have extended towards citizens. Complaints about use of 
force have become almost a daily concern.3 According to one report, 
between 2003 and 2008, internally-generated excessive force complaints 
had more than doubled (the number of citizen-generated complaints 
                                                                                                                              
* Charlotte Guerra is a student at Seattle University School of Law, class of 2016. The 
author would like to thank all of her professors for their guidance and support and, in 
particular, Professors Brooke Coleman, Deirdre Bowen, Sara Rankin, and Dean Spade. 
Kathryn Barnhouse, Matt Geyman, and Judge John Erlick have also been wonderful 
mentors during the author’s legal career. They have all been positive role models for the 
profession and for social change. The author would also like to thank Professor Deborah 
Ahrens for consulting on this paper’s topic in its early stages. 
1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 155 (1949).  
2 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION 2 
(2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-
report-web-rel1.pdf [hereinafter ACLU]. 
3 See, e.g., Bruce Taylor et al., Changes In Officer Use of Force Over Time: A 
Descriptive Analysis of a National Survey, 34 POLICING 211, 211–32 (2011). 
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remained stable),4 although actual officer injuries remained fairly 
unchanged (still being only about half as common as suspect injuries).5 This 
use of force is in excess of the appropriate courses of action afforded to a 
police force meant to protect citizens. The rights of citizens in both public 
and private spheres have been encroached by a police force that seems to 
care little about the erosion of civil liberties. As recent events in Ferguson, 
Missouri, and elsewhere have shown, in no other context is this quite as 
apparent as when direct confrontation occurs in the process of peaceful 
protest. 
The erosion of civil liberty by police action in the context of protest 
should be a source of concern for all citizens. Dependability and trust are 
vested in the police force to uphold the laws and protect citizens. A certain 
level of force is seen as necessary to keep the peace and for officers to carry 
out their duties effectively. However, when police action impedes on civil 
liberties like the right to peaceful assembly and protest, and it is perceived 
that the trust placed in the police has been breached, the system does not 
work effectively. This is because lives, property, and the public peace might 
be threatened. The principle is especially important in the context of 
peaceful protest. When a crowd has already been incited to an agitated state 
to the point of constitutionally protected protest, police reaction and 
methodology may make the difference between a dialog and a riot. As 
President Kennedy stated, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible 
will make violent revolution inevitable.”6 As the recent protests that began 
in Ferguson have highlighted, the current script for a peaceful revolution is 
corrupted. If a state or locality can give a better alternative, American 
society as a whole stands to gain. To protect the integrity of the police 
                                                                                                                              
4 Id. at 225–26 (there were also twice as many citizen-generated complaints as internally-
generated complaints). 
5 Id. 
6 John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Address on the First Anniversary of 
the Alliance for Progress (Mar. 13, 1962). 
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profession and to ensure the constitutional civil liberties of our citizens, 
reform is necessary. 
In 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) found, after an extensive 
investigation, that the Seattle Police Department (SPD) “has engaged in a 
pattern or practice of excessive force that violates the Constitution and 
federal law”;7 that the police force lacked adequate training for use of force; 
that supervisors failed to provide oversight on officers’ use of force; and 
that supervisors did not provide clear directions and expectations.8 The DOJ 
and SPD reached a settlement agreement of terms on July 27, 2012.9 As of 
mid-2015, the SPD had reportedly improved in several regards based on a 
Department of Justice assessment of police, although “significant work 
remains to be done.”10 Nevertheless, an internal memorandum claimed that 
Seattle police are not using enough force as of late-2014, and over 100 
Seattle police officers filed a federal lawsuit for their right to defend 
themselves.11 These actions generate a question of sincerity and 
demonstrate that there might be a disconnect between the police 
department’s policies in compliance with the DOJ and the department’s 
actual practices.12 In line with SPD’s stated dedication to change, and to 
better safeguard Seattle citizens’ civil liberties, this paper has several 
                                                                                                                              
7 Investigation Documents: Investigation of the Seattle Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/investigation-documents (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). 
8 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 2–19 
(Dec. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-
11.pdf. 
9 Investigation Documents, supra note 7. 
10 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 13 (2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/19/spd_fourthrpt_12-14.pdf. 
11 Renee Lewis, Seattle Police Aren’t Using Enough Force, Internal Memo Says, 
ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/26/seattle-police-force.html. 
12 See id. 
524 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
suggestions as to better effectuate that change and create a model police 
force to decrease the number of violent police interactions with the public. 
The militarization of the police has had a unique interplay with this 
country’s racial dynamics. According to the ACLU, the militarization of 
law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the use of “paramilitary weapons and 
tactics” have primarily impacted minorities.13 At the time of writing, a large 
component of the current protests concerned perceived racial inequalities 
and police interaction with minority groups, especially black citizens. Late-
2014 alone had several high profile cases in which officers killed unarmed 
black citizens. Cleveland police officers killed Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old 
boy, within seconds of the police cruiser pulling into the park where the boy 
was playing with his toy, non-lethal airsoft gun.14 John Crawford III was 
carrying an air rifle he had just picked up off of the shelf when police 
officers shot him in a Wal-Mart outside of Dayton, Ohio.15 New York City 
police officers killed Eric Garner while he was being held in an illegal 
chokehold.16 South Carolina Officer Michael T. Slager killed Walter Scott 
with multiple shots in the back as Mr. Scott fled, unarmed.17 
                                                                                                                              
13 ACLU, supra note 2, at 5. 
14 Tamir Rice Video Shows Cop Opening Fire on 12-year-old, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/26/tamir-rice-video-shows-
co_n_6227552.html. 
15 Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing 
John Crawford III, WASH. POST. (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-
surveillance-video-shows-police-shooting-and-killing-john-crawford-iii/. 
16 Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New York 
Police, TIME (July 22, 2014), http://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-
chokehold-death/. 
17 Thomas Barrabi, Walter Scott Shooting Video: Officer Michael Slager Arrested, 
Charged With Murder In South Carolina, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:55 PM 
EDT), http://www.ibtimes.com/walter-scott-shooting-video-officer-michael-slager-
arrested-charged-murder-south-1873345. 
Living Under the Boot 525 
VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 2 • 2015 
 These are not isolated incidents, and accusations of racial profiling, 
discriminatory practices, and racist policies persist across the nation.18 
Racial issues may also be especially prevalent in high-stress environments, 
such as those involving large groups of people who are currently protesting 
some aspect of government. In Seattle, the DOJ noted its investigation 
“raised serious concerns that some SPD policies and practices, particularly 
those related to pedestrian encounters, could result in discriminatory 
policing.”19 For instance, a tort claim was supposedly filed for an incident 
involving Jesse Hagopian, a history teacher, who SPD allegedly pepper 
sprayed while he was speaking on his cell phone moments after giving a 
speech at an anti-police brutality rally on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, 
2015.20 These types of incidents are indicative of a pervasive problem, both 
in Seattle and nationally, that touches on many aspects of both the right to 
protest and the increased militarization of the police, on nearly every level 
of application. However, race is a deep-seated and multi-dimensional issue, 
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address the impact of race. 
                                                                                                                              
18 See e.g., Redditt Hudson, Being a Cop Showed Me Just How Racist and Violent the 
Police Are. There’s Only One Fix, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/06/i-was-a-st-louis-cop-
my-peers-were-racist-and-violent-and-theres-only-one-fix/. 
19 Investigation Documents, supra note 7.  
20 Ansel Herz, Watch Seattle Police Pepper Spray Teacher Jesse Hagopian on MLK Day, 
STRANGER (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:17 PST), 
http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2015/01/28/watch-seattle-police-pepper-spray-
teacher-jesse-hagopian-on-mlk-day; see Ansel Herz, Reprimand for Seattle Cop Who 
Pepper-Sprayed Jesse Hagopian, STRANGER (Sept. 14, 2015, 2:16 PST), 
http://www.thestranger.com/blogs/slog/2015/09/14/22858334/discipline-recommended-
for-seattle-cop-who-pepper-sprayed-teacher-jesse-hagopian; OFFICE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, CLOSED CASE SUMMARY: COMPLAINT NUMBER OPA#2015-0086 2–3 
(2015), available at 
http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/OPA/ClosedCaseSummaries/2015-
0086ccs09-11-15.pdf (the officer’s use of force was “not reasonable, necessary or 
proportional,” and the officer failed to direct force towards specific individuals posing a 
threat). 
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While police response to protest has become a national issue, actually 
addressing the problem needs to come from individual states and police 
departments. For the purposes of this paper, the emphasis will be placed on 
Washington State, and particularly on SPD. This paper will use SPD as an 
example of a police department that has a history of the use of excessive 
force in the context of protest; policies initiated in Seattle have had a ripple 
effect on police policy in reaction to protest nationwide, and SPD might be 
used as a model for change. In terms of remedy, this paper will focus on 
statewide and local statutory and regulatory change to return to Peelian 
Principles21 of policing; alter police uniforms; create stricter sanctions for 
complaints of excessive use of force; require police officers to wear “body-
cams” on their persons; require reliable reporting of how many citizens are 
harmed by police officers; ban or limit Washington police departments’ 
ownership of military-grade weapons; and limit the accepted methods of 
non-lethal crowd control. 
This paper will first briefly address the historical progression of 
militarization of police departments and its interrelation with protest 
response. This section will address: (1) the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) protests in Seattle as an example and the model for future police-
citizen contact during protest; (2) some of the sustaining governmental 
programs behind this increased police militarization, the kinds of military-
grade equipment LEAs have been receiving, and how these agencies were 
eligible to receive this equipment; and (3) culminating events and current 
police response to peaceful protest, as in the example of the protests 
currently occurring in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere at the time of this 
paper’s writing. 
                                                                                                                              
21 Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/sir-robert-peels-nine-principles-of-
policing.html?_r=1 [hereinafter N.Y. TIMES]. 
Living Under the Boot 527 
VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 2 • 2015 
The second half of this paper will focus on remedies, which include 
statutory and regulatory change: (1) changing training methods on crowd 
control to emphasize citizens’ rights of free speech and protest, decreasing 
the number of altercations between civilians and police, and finding 
alternative methods of resolution by returning to Peelian Principles of 
policing that emphasize community policing and using force as a last resort; 
(2) altering uniforms, such as through color changes, to decrease the risk of 
confrontation between officers and civilians; (3) creating more rigid 
enforcement—such as sanctions—when police officers face accusations of 
excessive force or assault while either on-duty or off-duty, including a point 
system that removes discretion from officers’ superiors and ultimately 
results in termination if enough complaints are logged; (4) creating greater 
police accountability to the public, such as through the use of tamper-proof 
and reliable cameras worn on the officers’ persons; (5) requiring reliable 
reporting on how many people are injured by police officers in both fatal 
and non-fatal ways during police interaction; (6) banning or limiting 
Washington police departments’ ownership of assaultive military-grade 
weaponry; and (7) limiting the accepted methods of non-lethal crowd 
control, especially where chemical weapons are concerned. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: THE STAMPING 
A. The World Trade Organization Conference Protests in Seattle: Setting 
the Tone 
In the present era, peaceful protest is subject to some limitations. Under 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a state may impose restrictions on the 
time, place, and manner of expression, whether it be oral, written, or 
through conduct.22 Peaceful protest includes symbolic expression, like the 
                                                                                                                              
22 Nick Suplina, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political 
Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (2005); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
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Ferguson-inspired protest “die-ins”—where protestors lay on the ground in 
public spaces as though they had been killed—to address police brutality 
and racial profiling.23 The Supreme Court has articulated that First 
Amendment rights for free speech and peaceful assembly are protected, and 
states cannot restrict protest on the basis of the content of the speech (for 
instance, when the speech is criticizing the state and the restriction is 
targeted at silencing such criticism).24 Otherwise, when the court weighs 
speech rights against state interests, the court gives the state deference.25 
In the context of protest, this deference means that many symbolic forms 
of expression that would have had greater effect if delivered at a specific 
time, space, or manner, may be curtailed by the state if the rule was content-
neutral.26 To give a modern example, after Michael Brown’s death kick-
started the Ferguson protests, demonstrations near his memorial and 
candlelit vigils in his honor held much more symbolic significance than if 
the protestors had congregated in, for example, a nearby parking lot. 
However, the Court will usually find “content-neutral” restrictions 
constitutional “provided that they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information” they are trying to convey.27 
However, to be considered “narrowly tailored,” it need not be the least 
restrictive or intrusive means if the substantial government interest is still 
                                                                                                                              
23 Clark, 468 U.S. at 294; see also, e.g., Holly Yan, ‘Ferguson Is Everywhere’: More 
Crowds Demand Action as Obama Lays Out a Plan, CNN (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/02/us/ferguson-aftermath/. 
24 See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Suplina, supra note 22, at 399. 
25 Suplina, supra note 22, at 399. 
26 See id. at 405–07. 
27 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
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being met.28 This was already the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
expression rights going into the 1990s. 
Towards the close of 1999, Seattle hosted the WTO Conference.29 The 
widespread marches, protests, and the extreme police response—known as 
the “Battle in Seattle”—became a “landmark moment in how police handle 
protest in America,”30 primarily by way of shutting it down. On November 
30, 1999, nearly 40,000 globalization protestors held demonstrations in the 
streets and blocked many conference delegates from reaching the 
convention site.31 Seattle had advance warning of the protestors’ intent, and, 
in fact, had weeks of training.32 This was not a spontaneous event. 
Nonetheless, the city was apparently unprepared for the protests’ sheer 
size.33 Although the “vast majority of protesters were peaceful, obeyed the 
police, and were not civilly disobedient,” the property damage, police 
altercations, and panic at the government level resulted in the issuance of 
three emergency orders that created daytime curfews and effective “no-
protest” zones in the city, mandating the time, place, and manner of 
permitted protest.34 Then-Mayor Paul Schell also criminalized personal 
possession of gas masks, “an order that almost certainly exceeded his 
authority and was probably unconstitutional.”35 After the mayor issued the 
                                                                                                                              
28 Suplina, supra note 22, at 402–03; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781, 798–99 (1989). 
29 World Trade Organization Protests in Seattle, SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-document-
libraries/world-trade-organization-protests-in-seattle (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
30 Radley Balko, After Ferguson, How Should Police Respond to Protests?, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/08/14/after-
ferguson-how-should-police-respond-to-protests/. 
31 Aaron Perrine, The First Amendment Versus the World Trade Organization: 
Emergency Powers and the Battle in Seattle, 76 WASH. L. REV. 635, 635–36 (2001). 
32 Id. 
33 Id.; RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 235 (2014). 
34 Perrine, supra note 31, at 637–38. 
35
 BALKO, supra note 33. 
530 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
emergency order, police from around the state and the National Guard were 
deployed, resulting in multiple altercations, mass arrests, and preemptive 
SWAT raids.36 Police in full riot gear, rather than the more crowd-friendly 
standard police uniform, were on the front lines.37 
The officers’ actual actions may sound dishearteningly familiar at this 
point. Officers liberally used tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber and plastic 
bullets, apparently targeting both the press and the legal observers, while 
herding the crowd through the streets.38 Observers noted that the police 
wore neither badges nor identifying nameplates, which some believe may 
have “emboldened” them through anonymity.39 According to one 
eyewitness, the officers “offered no avenue of escape. It was an effort not to 
disperse, but to punish the crowds.”40 The city’s actions were ultimately 
deemed a violation of more than 170 protestors’ constitutional rights.41 
According to an ACLU special report, citizens’ constitutionally protected 
rights to protest “paid a dear price for poor judgment calls made by public 
officials and police personnel every step of the way. The [c]ity must 
acknowledge what went wrong and take actions to avoid similar mistakes in 
the future.”42 
                                                                                                                              
36 Perrine, supra note 31, at 639–40; Balko, supra note 30. 
37 BALKO, supra note 33, at 234. 
38 Interview by Jim Compton with Joshua Alex, Law Student, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 9, 
2000); telephone interview by Jim Compton with Tara Herivel, Legal Observer (Aug. 3, 
2000); telephone interview by Jim Compton with Dick Burton, Philosophy Professor, at 
Seattle Central Community College (Aug. 3, 2000); interview by Jim Compton of Nicole 
Zimmer, Legal Observer, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 3, 2000). 
39 Interview by Jim Compton with Isak Bressler, Legal Observer, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 
3, 2000). 
40 Telephone Interview by Jim Compton with Pavlovs Stavropolous, Computer Instructor 
(Aug. 8, 2000). 
41 BALKO, supra note 33, at 236. 
42 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, OUT OF CONTROL: SEATTLE’S FLAWED RESPONSE TO 
PROTESTS AGAINST THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (2000), available at 
https://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/WTO%20Report%20Web.pdf. 
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Seattle’s response to protest set the tone across the nation for how the 
states would interact with protestors through use of their police force for 
years to come.43 The primary concern for police during protests would be 
their own sense of control.44 For instance, on November 18, 2011, on the 
University of California-Davis campus, protestors congregated as part of 
the Occupy movement to protest state education funding cuts.45 Campus 
police descended in riot gear and then pepper sprayed the seated, non-
violent protestors when they refused to disperse.46 Former Seattle Police 
Chief, Norm Stamper, said: 
[The WTO Protests in Seattle] set a number of precedents, most of 
them bad. And police departments across the country learned all 
the wrong lessons from us. That’s disheartening. So disheartening. 
I mean, you look at what happened to those Occupy protesters at 
U.C. Davis, where the cop just sprays them down like he’s 
watering a bed of flowers, and I think that we played a part in 
making that sort of thing so common—so easy to do now.47 
Police are still grappling with the effects of these attitudes today, with 
increased police aggression during protest only being further amplified by 
policy and the increased presence of military-grade equipment. 
                                                                                                                              
43 Balko, supra note 30. 
44 Id. 
45 Elliot Burr, Los Altos Native Pepper-Sprayed at UC Davis Protests, LOS ALTOS TOWN 
CRIER (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.losaltosonline.com/news/sections/news/215-news-
briefs/13174-J41706. 
46 Id.; Adam Gabbatt, UC Davis Pepper Spray Police Officer Awarded $38,000 
Compensation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/23/pepper-spray-cop-uc-davis-
compensation. John Pike, the officer who performed the pepper spraying, was 
subsequently awarded $38,000 in worker’s compensation for depression and anxiety over 
the death threats he received for his actions. Id.  
47 Balko, supra note 30. 
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B. The Studied Increase in the Militarization of Police 
The events in Seattle did not happen in a vacuum. Some have pointed to 
the “unnecessarily and dangerously militarized” state of American police 
forces accounting for the increased civil liberties erosion when it comes to 
protest.48 Excessive militarization of the American police force has resulted 
in officers viewing their jobs in an increasingly combative light that might 
make them seek out more aggressive tactics in the direct confrontation that 
protest generates.49 Police training encourages officers to think of 
themselves as warriors and to see civilians as potential adversaries.50 The 
emphasis has changed from protecting citizens and serving the community 
to protecting police and preserving order.51 According to one Missouri 
police chief, Betty Taylor, oftentimes the “us-versus-them mentality takes 
over . . . [W]hen you get into that mentality, there are no innocent people. 
There’s us and there’s the enemy.”52 The more we train and dress up local 
law enforcement officers as soldiers, the more they will begin to act like 
soldiers. 
Part of the concern for police militarization relates to the ownership and 
use of military-grade equipment by state and local peacekeepers against US 
citizens. To scale back police militarization, the ACLU has looked to both 
the stockpiling of military-grade equipment and the police training that 
fosters a “warrior” mentality toward civilians.53 
                                                                                                                              
48 ACLU, supra note 2. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 3. 
51 See Balko, supra note 30. 
52 BALKO, supra note 33, at 241. 
53 See ACLU, supra note 2, at 3. 
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1. Military-Grade Equipment: The Department of Homeland Security 
Grants and the 1033 Program 
The military-grade weapons source for many LEAs in the United States 
comes from either grants from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) or from the Department of Defense Excess Property Program (1033 
Program).54 LEAs were able to receive grants to fight against “terrorist 
threats” after September 11, 2001, when the government, responding to the 
World Trade Center attack, created the DHS.55 In 2011 alone, the DHS gave 
$2 billion in grants.56 The department then “makes little effort to track how 
the grants are spent,” to track the equipment bought with the funds, or even 
to assess first whether the requesting agency may be facing any “tangible 
threat of terrorism.”57 For instance, Fargo, North Dakota, has a population 
of less than 116,000 people, and the closest foreign nation, Canada, is a US 
ally.58 Nevertheless, Fargo has received $8 million in grants from DHS to 
purchase “assault rifles, Kevlar helmets, and an armored truck with a 
rotating turret.”59 Presumably, Fargo could purchase a wood chipper if its 
police department could manufacture a use against local criminals. 
Ultimately, DHS has given out “at least $34 billion in anti-terror grants 
since its inception.”60 
                                                                                                                              
54 Linda Feldman, Ferguson: How Pentagon’s ‘1033 Program’ Helped Militarize Small-




56 BALKO, supra note 33, at 255–56. 
57 Robert Balko, Why is a SWAT Team Assaulting Me? I’m Just Dancing at a Rave, 
SALON (Jul. 30, 2013), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/30/why_is_a_swat_team_assaulting_me_im_just_dancing
_at_a_rave/. 
58 Fargo (city), North Dakota, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 8, 2014), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/38/3825700.html. 
59 Balko, supra note 57. 
60 Id. 
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In terms of the 1033 Program, the National Defense Authorization Act 
(the “Act”) allows transferal of Department of Defense (DoD) property to 
federal, state, and local departments.61 The program has been overseen 
through the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) within the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) since 1995.62 Initially, the program was only 
intended to assist against the War on Drugs, but as of 1997, any agency may 
request the property for “bona fide law enforcement purposes that assist in 
their arrest and apprehension mission,” with preference given for “counter-
drug and counter-terrorism requests.”63 To be eligible, states create a 
business relationship with the DLA through a Memorandum of Agreement, 
and then the state governor appoints a state coordinator to maintain property 
accountability records and investigate any alleged misuse.64 Once the state 
coordinator and the LESO approve an LEA to participate in the 1033 
Program, the LEA may appoint officials to obtain the equipment.65 Nearly 
half a billion dollars worth of military equipment was given out in 2013 
alone.66 In total, over $4.3 billion dollars worth of equipment has been 
transferred since the 1033 Program’s inception.67 
                                                                                                                              
61 Federal Surplus, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ENTERPRISE SERV. (Aug. 5, 2014) 
http://www.des.wa.gov/services/Surplus/BuySurplus/Pages/FederalSurplus.aspx; 1033 
Program FAQs, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY, 
http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/ProgramF
AQs.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
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2. The Equipment 
The amount and kind of military-grade equipment making its way into 
local police departments’ hands is fairly staggering. For instance, the police 
department in Maricopa County, Arizona, has over 21,000 types of military 
equipment, including a .50 caliber machine gun that fires “bullets powerful 
enough to blast through the buildings on multiple city blocks.”68 According 
to the ACLU, the 63 responding agencies had received over 15,054 “battle 
uniforms or personal protective equipment.”69 However, these responding 
agencies are only a small fraction of the total LEAs in the country. More 
than 8,000 LEAs have enrolled in the 1033 Program nationwide.70 This 
figure does not include those who have otherwise received separate DHS 
grants. In total, approximately 500 towns have received Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.71 Other equipment included bomb 
suits, night vision equipment, guns, rifles, surveillance and reconnaissance 
equipment, utility trucks, GPS devices, helicopters, flashbang grenades, and 
more.72 
Washington State has not been immune to the siren call of sweet, sweet 
federal funding. Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole made publicly 
available a listing of the equipment received through the 1033 Program.73 
Between 2006 and 2015, Washington received equipment through the 1033 
Program totaling $20,945,358.57 in value.74 The equipment Washington 
                                                                                                                              
68 ACLU, supra note 2, at 13.  
69 Id. at 22. 
70 1033 Program FAQs, supra note 61. 
71 ACLU, supra note 2, at 22. 
72 Id. at 13–14. 
73 Kathleen O’Toole, Seattle Police Chief, Address at Seattle University School of Law: 
The Changing Role of Police in Our Community (Mar. 6, 2015). 
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State has requisitioned ranges from utility trucks, night vision equipment, 
rifles, mine resistant vehicles, and more.75 The King County Sheriff’s 
Department has acquired over $2 million in equipment, including 
helicopters, armored trucks, and night vision equipment, while SPD has 
acquired over $250,000 in equipment over the same time period.76  
3. Acquisition and Eligibility 
The process for acquiring the DoD property is fairly simple. To be 
eligible to receive property, one needs to be a federal, state, or local LEA.77 
The LEA can either physically visit a Defense Reutilization and Marketing 
Office or review the inventory online through the Defense Reutilization and 
Marketing Service.78 The weapon acquisition application differs depending 
on the LEA, but may consist of a single page.79 The state coordinator 
approves the request based on two criteria: “(1) that the agency intends to 
use the equipment for a [‘]law enforcement purpose[’] . . , and (2) that the 
transfer would result in a [‘]fair and equitable distribution[’] of property 
based on current inventory.”80 Additionally, the Memorandum of 
Agreement making LEAs eligible for the program also provides that the 
item issuance should be no more than one per officer in the requesting 
agency.81 In the ACLU’s two-year study, they did not discover a single 
                                                                                                                              
75 Complete Inventory of 1033 Property, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ENTERPRISE SERV. (Jul. 1, 
2015) www.des.wa.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Surplus/1033/1033PropertyBook.xlsx. 
76 Id. 
77 See Federal Surplus, supra note 61. 
78 The 1033 Program, JUSTNET, https://www.justnet.org/other/1033_program.html (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2015) (the department then sends an application for the requested items to 
their State Point of Contact (SPOC); upon SPOC approval, the application goes on to the 
LESO). 
79 See Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) Weapon Request, TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/LawEnforcementSupport/documents/weaponRqst.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
80 ACLU, supra note 2, at 29. 
81 Id. 
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denied equipment request.82 After the property is in the agency’s 
possession, the DLA conducts a Program Compliance Review once every 
two years.83 During the review, 20 percent of a state’s inventory is typically 
physically reviewed; at random, any one site may be forced to account for 
100 percent of 1033 Program “weapons, aircraft, watercraft and tactical 
vehicles[,] and a minimum of 10 [percent] of all other controlled 
property.”84 However, the only significant responsibilities placed on the 
acquiring agencies are that they do not sell the equipment obtained and that 
they maintain accurate inventories.85 Failure to conduct a required inventory 
may result in a suspension from the program, “but there are no 
consequences for overly aggressive use of equipment.”86 
B. Culminating Events and Current Response to Protests 
Ultimately, many of these factors have worked to culminate in some of 
the widespread protests against police action that are currently underway at 
the time of writing, and the atmosphere in this country is trending towards 
mobilized political action in protest against what has been seen as 
oppressive police conduct. While much of the current furor centers on 
accusations of racial targeting, a widespread national discussion on police 
militarization was also kick-started when officers responded for over three 
months to primarily peaceful protest in Ferguson, Missouri, with tear gas, 
rubber bullets, and military-grade weapons acquired through the 1033 
                                                                                                                              
82 Id. at 30. 
83 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION 8 (Dec. 2014), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enfor
cement_equipment_acquisition.pdf. 
84  Id. 
85 ACLU, supra note 2, at 29. 
86 Id. at 30. 
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Program.87 Accusations that police escalated matters, targeted media, and 
refused to wear required name tags88—much in the same manner as police 
during the WTO protests89—has resulted in a concurrent federal inquiry into 
events90 and at least one public apology from Ferguson Police Chief 
Thomas Jackson.91 Attorney General Eric Holder responded to the situation 
early on by emphasizing that police should be reducing tension, not 
heightening it, respecting the rights of those who peacefully gather, and that 
“journalists must not be harassed or prevented from covering a story that 
needs to be told.”92 At the time of writing, the situation is still developing as 
a recent grand jury failed to indict the officer.93 Citizens continue to voice 
                                                                                                                              
87 See Amanda Terkel & Ryan J. Reilly, Fire Tear Gas at Protestors Hours Before 
Curfew (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/17/ferguson-protests_n_5686601.html; see also 
Paige Lavender, Ferguson Protests Hit With Tear Gas, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/25/ferguson-tear-gas_n_6218914.html; 
see also Mike Lillis, Congress Mulls Response to Ferguson, THE HILL (Aug. 7, 2014), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/216863-congress-mulls-response-to-ferguson-
tragedy. 
88 See Letter from Christy E. Lopez, Deputy Chief, Civil Rights Div. of the Dep’t of 
Justice, to Thomas Jackson, Police Chief of Ferguson, Mo. (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/DOJLetterOnNameplates.pdf; see also Ferguson 
Police Targeting Media With Arrests, Tear Gas, Bean Bags and Blackouts, MINTPRESS 
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.mintpressnews.com/ferguson-police-targeting-media-
arrests-tear-gas-blackouts/195327/. 
89 See interview by Jim Compton with Isak Bressler, supra note 39. 
90 Press Release, Statement by Attorney Gen. Holder on Recent Shooting Incident in 
Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-holder-recent-shooting-
incident-ferguson-missouri. 
91 Elliott C. McLaughlin & Ana Cabrera, Apology or Not, Ferguson Police Chief Tells 
CNN: I Will Not Step Down, CNN (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/us/ferguson-michael-brown-police-chief-apology/. 
92 Press Release, Statement by Attorney General Eric Holder on Latest Developments in 
Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-latest-
developments-ferguson-missouri. 
93 See Press Release, Nat’l Bar Assoc., The National Bar Association Responds to the 
Grand Jury’s Decision Not to Indict Police Officer Darren Wilson in the Shooting Death 
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accusations of corruption and mishandling the situation, and the current 
police response to peaceful protest is becoming a national debate.94 
III. REPAIRING THE DAMAGE: THE HUMAN FACE 
A. Returning to Peelian Principles 
In some ways, the militarization of police can be combated by very 
simple changes in how the police culture is cultivated. Rather than 
emphasizing police officers’ roles as “warriors” and promoting an 
atmosphere that will lead to more clashes with police when large groups 
gather together in protest, society should be emphasizing police officers’ 
roles as “guardians.” Training should paint the police force in terms of its 
community and the protection of civilians rather than seeing citizens as an 
enemy or an obstruction. 
Some have suggested a return to some of the principles of policing 
suggested by Sir Robert Peel in the 19th century to create an ethical police 
force.95 Among these Peelian Principles is the concept that the “approval 
and trust of the public is vital in order for police to carry out their 
mission.”96 The police do not live as separate entities from their 
                                                                                                                              
of Michael Brown (Nov. 24, 2014), available at http://us7.campaign-
archive1.com/?u=b493e6c4d31beda32fdaf8e2d&id=73514e334b.  
94 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Findings of Two 
Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri – Justice Department Finds a Pattern of 
Civil Rights Violations by the Ferguson Police Department (Mar. 4, 2015), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civil-rights-
investigations-ferguson-missouri (the DOJ found civil rights violations in the Ferguson 
Police Department, including a pattern or practice of racial bias and violations of the 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments). 
95 Timothy Roufa, Guardians or Warriors? The Changing Role of Law Enforcement, 
ABOUT.COM, http://criminologycareers.about.com/od/Career_Trends/fl/Guardians-or-
Warriors-The-Changing-Role-of-Law-Enforcement.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
96 Id.; N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21. There are nine chief principles including: (1) police 
exist to prevent crime and disorder; (2) public approval of police actions is required for 
police to fulfill their duties; (3) public cooperation to voluntarily observe the law is 
necessary for police to secure and maintain the public’s respect; (4) greater cooperation 
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communities. They are a part of the communities they serve; therefore, they 
must adhere to the law like any other citizen, and force should only be used 
as a last resort and “not the first reaction.”97 That mutual trust in 
compliance, and respect for both the citizens and the law, is necessary for 
the police to maintain order and prevent crime. Along those same lines, the 
police force functions best—and has achieved its ultimate goal—if the 
public is voluntarily complying with the law.98 The mission should not be to 
put away as many people as possible, but to foster good citizenship and 
self-policing. The absence of crime is the ultimate measure for the effective 
police department.99 
On the whole, many of these suggestions already comport with several 
LEAs’ stated policy goals. Using SPD as a model, the department has seven 
core principles related to their use of force, including looking to uphold 
citizens’ constitutional rights while minimizing the need for use of force.100 
“The community expects and SPD requires that officers use only the force 
necessary to perform their duties and that such force be proportional to the 
threat or resistance of the subject under the circumstances.”101 Looking to 
proportionality, necessity, reasonableness, and de-escalation—policies the 
consent decree reemphasized for the SPD102—aligns with Peelian Principles 
that recognize the importance of the community’s expectations and the 
                                                                                                                              
requires less force; (5) public favor is garnered by impartial service to the law; (6) 
physical force is a last resort and only used to the extent necessary; (7) the police is a part 
of the public and the public is in the police; (8) police should direct their actions towards 
their functions and not usurp judiciary powers; and (9) police efficiency can be measured 
by the absence of crime. 
97 Roufa, supra note 95. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Use of Force Core Principles, SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/08_000_Use_of_Force_Core_Principl
es.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Use of Force]. 
101 Id. 
102 See SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, supra note 10, at 16–18. 
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police force’s respect.103 However, the terminology still seems somewhat 
skewed, in practice. “Necessary,” as defined by SPD, consists of “when no 
reasonably effective alternative appears to exist,” where the reasonableness 
inquiry requires judgment, not by a reasonable person standard, but “from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene” (emphasis added).104 
Similarly, the proportionality analysis for the use of force follows the same 
reasonableness inquiry and looks to the “totality of the circumstances.”105 
The manual very nearly quotes a 1989 Supreme Court decision to stress that 
these inquiries must “allow for the fact that police officers are often forced 
to make split-second decisions—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation.”106 The inquiry is thus necessarily skewed towards what 
seems reasonable in the insulated judgment of officers. 
Unfortunately, looking to what might have been reasonable for a police 
officer is still in line with several Supreme Court decisions and most trends 
across the country when it comes to evaluating police conduct. In 1985, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Tennessee v. Garner, using a Fourth Amendment 
“objective reasonableness” test, that “where the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to 
the officer or to others,” such as if the suspect is armed, “it is not 
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”107 
This reasoning seems like it could be beneficial to unarmed citizens trying 
to claim the use of force was unreasonable if they are fired upon when 
attempting to escape. However, this “objective reasonableness” test was 
given further definition just four years later when the Supreme Court ruled 
                                                                                                                              
103 See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 21. 
104 Use of Force, supra note 100. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. (although I could see no citation to indicate it was a quote); Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
107 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
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that the reasonableness of the force used “must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight.”108 In other words, the officer on the ground may have 
the benefit of the doubt based on his or her perspective, even with fleeing, 
unarmed citizens. The SPD Manual is thus in line with the Supreme Court 
decisions. 
However, the Supreme Court sets the floor, not the ceiling, on what 
might be expected from officers in the line of duty. Local expectations 
could be set either by codifying the standard under a “reasonable person” 
rather than a “reasonable officer” standard,” or simply by changing training 
methods for police to instead emphasize the Peelian Principle that force is a 
last-resort option. The reasonable person, and not the reasonable officer, 
might create a more objective standard that does not inherently favor the 
police even by its phrasing. In any case, the law already would encompass 
an officer’s unique perspective and the totality of the circumstances under a 
plain reasonable person analysis. Using the standard of the “reasonable 
officer” confounds several Peelian Principles relating to seeing the police as 
part of the community and even the department’s own stated policy goals. It 
creates a division between what may seem reasonable to any random citizen 
in a community and what “cop-logic” may dictate. Police may agree on 
what force is reasonable, but that is not necessarily a reflection of the 
opinions of the communities they serve. 
In practice, police often have very wide discretion in their use of force.109 
In 2010, after a four-second warning, an SPD officer killed Native 
American John T. Williams, a hearing-impaired woodcarver in Seattle, for 
walking around the city with a piece of wood and his three-inch pocket 
                                                                                                                              
108 Connor, 490 U.S. at 396. 
109 Chase Madar, Why It’s Impossible to Indict a Cop, THE NATION (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/190937/why-its-impossible-indict-cop. 
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knife.110 Neither the King County prosecutor (precluded because malice 
could not be proven) nor the federal prosecutors (could not show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the officer “acted willfully and with the deliberate and 
specific intent” to violate Williams’s civil rights) prosecuted the officer.111 
However, the city did eventually settle with the family for $1.5 million.112 
In terms of crowd control, the use of force becomes particularly 
problematic. In Washington, to prosecute either gross misdemeanor or 
felony riot requires a defendant—acting knowingly and unlawfully with 
three or more people—to use, threaten to use, or participate in the use of 
force against another person or property.113 The misdemeanor of “failure to 
disperse” occurs when a person has been ordered to disperse by a police 
officer or public servant and when the person “congregates with a group of 
three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group 
which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or 
substantial harm to property” (emphasis added).114 The SPD Manual instead 
frames dispersal in terms of “imminent” risk to a more amorphous concept 
of “public safety.”115 In other words, there need not be a particular person or 
property at risk of harm. This framing again puts the discretion more in the 
                                                                                                                              
110 Fern Renville, The Shooting Death of John T. Williams, INDIAN COUNTRY (Feb. 21, 
2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/02/21/shooting-death-john-t-
williams-18538.  
111 Mike Carter, No Federal Civil-Rights Charges for Former SPD Officer Ian Birk, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017233847_birk14m.html. 
112 Casey McNerthney, Woodcarver’s Family To Get $1.5 Million From City, SEATTLEPI 
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Woodcarvers-family-to-get-1-5-
million-from-city-1359018.php. 
113 11A WASH. PRAC., PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. WPIC 126.02 (3d ed. 2014); 11A 
WASH. PRAC., PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. WPIC 126.03 (3d ed. 2014). 
114 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.020 (2011). 
115 Demonstration Management, SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/14_090_Demonstration_Management.
html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
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officers’ hands at the ground level, keeping in mind reasonableness of these 
actions will be evaluated by a “reasonable officer” standard.116 
This problematic phrasing does not always seem to have resulted in much 
observable restraint. During the Occupy Seattle protests, SPD faced heavy 
criticism for their crowd control tactics and use of force.117 On November 
16, 2011, during a peaceful march that blocked downtown intersections, 
officers reportedly pepper sprayed the protesters in the face, among them a 
pregnant teenager who required hospitalization, a priest, and 84-year-old 
Dorli Rainey.118 Then-Mayor Mike McGinn apologized for the incident 
mere hours after Dorli Rainey’s photo garnered viral attention online.119 
Later, in the Seattle May Day 2013 and 2014 protests, the police claimed to 
have only taken action to arrest offenders after the crowd instigated either 
property damage or pelted the police with rocks, bottles, or other objects.120 
While some have commended SPD’s recent restraint, historically, others 
have reported that once dispersion techniques begin, the police may 
indiscriminately use force on an otherwise peaceful crowd with a few 
                                                                                                                              
116 Use of Force, supra note 100. 
117 See, e.g., At Occupy Seattle, 84-Year-Old Activist, Pregnant Teen, Priest Among 
Those Pepper Sprayed, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/16/pregnant-teen-elderly-wom_n_1096895.html 
[hereinafter At Occupy Seattle]. 
118 Id. 
119 Mike Lindblom & Lynn Thompson, Pepper-Sprayed Woman Gets Mayor’s Apology, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016784455_occupy17m.html. 
120 Amanda Watts & Lindy Royce-Bartlett, 17 Arrested as Seattle May Day Protests Turn 
Violent, CNN (May 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/01/us/seattle-may-day-
protests/; Manuel Valdes, Protesters Pepper-Sprayed, Arrested During Seattle May Day 
March, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/02/seattle-may-day_n_5253707.html. 
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unruly members,121 or else the police unfairly target certain kinds of 
demonstrators such as legal observers or the press.122 
This last accusation, relating to targeting the press or people trying to 
record police action, is especially challenging. The SPD Manual explicitly 
states that retaliation is prohibited.123 Retaliation includes “discouragement, 
intimidation, coercion, or adverse action against any person” engaging in 
such lawful acts as exercising a constitutional right or recording incidents, 
so this almost certainly includes pepper spray.124 Moreover, SPD has 
explicitly adopted a Use of Force Policy that calls for “minimal reliance 
upon the use of physical force” in all interactions with the public.125 The 
measures exist, then, to try to prevent this kind of behavior. The more 
difficult aspect seems to be compliance. Perhaps stricter enforcement of the 
police’s own policies is required. Additionally, framing the use of force as a 
last resort (using Peelian terms), rather than encouraging police to exert 
force when the amorphous “public safety” is at risk, may result in fewer 
clashes and better preserve both police-community relations and citizens’ 
rights to free speech and peaceful protest. 
B. Uniform Changes to Create Uniform Change 
Another very simple but effective change could be made just in the police 
uniform. Currently, SPD’s standard uniform for officers consists of “French 
Blue” (darker blue) uniform shirts, the “Anti-Crime” and SWAT teams 
                                                                                                                              
121 See At Occupy Seattle, supra note 117. 
122 See interview by Jim Compton with Joshua Alex, supra note 38; see also telephone 
interview by Jim Compton with Dick Burton, supra note 38; see also interview by Jim 
Compton of Nicole Zimmer, supra note 38. 
123 Responsibilities of Employees Concerning Complaints of Possible Misconduct, 
SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/05_002_Responsibilities_Employees_
Concerning_Complaints_Possible_Misconduct.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). 
124 Id. 
125 Use of Force, supra note 100. 
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wear black uniform shirts, and the bike teams wear black polo shirts.126 
Even the simple change from dark and intimidating to a softer, pale blue 
could have drastic positive effects on the police-community relationship. 
Appearances are important, especially in the context of protest. Color 
palette might be especially determinative. Some have suggested that “dark 
police uniform may be subconsciously encouraging citizens to perceive 
officers as aggressive[,] evil, or corrupt,” while “police officers in dark 
uniforms may be subconsciously influenced to act more aggressively.”127 
Increasingly, even in simple raids, police are dressing in “battle dress 
uniforms” (BDUs) originally designed by the United States Army.128 
From a psychological standpoint, dressing in military-style regalia can 
have a clear effect on one’s attitude. “One tends to throw caution to the 
wind when wearing ‘commando-chic’ regalia, a bulletproof vest with the 
word ‘POLICE’ emblazoned on both sides, and when one is armed with 
high tech weaponry.”129 This cuts both ways, as citizens are less likely to 
see battle-dressed officers as individuals and more as cogs in a clockwork 
government entity that cares little for whether the citizen is in the direct 
path of its machinations. According to Salt Lake City Police Chief, Chris 
Burbank: 
Some say not using [riot gear] exposes my officers to a little bit 
more risk. That could be, but risk is part of the job. I’m just 
convinced that when we don riot gear, it says ‘throw rocks and 
bottles at us.’ It invites confrontation. Two-way communication 
                                                                                                                              
126 SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, 2013 UNIFORM REFERENCE CATALOG 14, 19, 21 (2014), 
available at 
http://www.seattle.gov/police/publications/manual/documents/09_020_URC.pdf. 
127 Richard R. Johnson, The Psychological Influence of the Police Uniform, 
POLICEONE.COM (Mar. 4, 2005), http://www.policeone.com/police-
products/apparel/undergear/articles/99417-The-psychological-influence-of-the-police-
uniform/. 
128 ACLU, supra note 2, at 22. 
129 Id. (quoting retired police officer Bill Donnelly). 
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and cooperation are what’s important. If one side overreacts, then 
it all falls apart.130 
This is not a recent observation. In times of protest and civil unrest, it has 
not been uncommon for police chiefs to put the more heavily-armored riot 
control teams out of direct public sight, instead parked in buses and held in 
reserve as back-up to a less intimidating police front.131 The theory is to put 
up a front that is not directly antagonizing and that might incite less 
violence from a crowd.132 More extreme methods have been attempted, as 
when the Menlo Park Police Department in California changed their 
paramilitary navy uniform to a “forest green sport coat blazer worn over 
black slacks” in 1969.133 While resultant changes were likely not solely due 
to the change of uniform, nonetheless, within 18 months of the uniform 
change, psychological tests indicated the presence of less authoritarian 
characteristics in the police force; “assaults on the Menlo Park police 
decreased by 30 [percent], and injuries to civilians by the police dropped 50 
[percent].”134 
These types of police uniform reforms has typically failed for a few 
reasons. One is that moving away from traditional uniforms could fail to 
command requisite respect for police to perform their duties. In the Menlo 
Park example, although there was an initial drop in civilian altercations, by 
the time the department reverted to the paramilitary uniforms again eight 
years later, assaults on the police were actually double what they had been 
before the change, prompting the return to typical police uniform.135 
Another reason police uniform reform has failed has been due to 
pushback from police themselves. While the pseudo-military affectation is 
                                                                                                                              
130 Balko, supra note 30. 
131 BALKO, supra note 33, at 99. 
132 Id. 
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problematic on many levels to citizens who do not wish to feel as though 
they are living in occupied territory, the feeling of authority that comes with 
these trappings can be very compelling. Power, once acquired, may not be 
relinquished; it instead creates a gnawing hunger for more of the like. 
“[E]xperience hath shewn, that even under the best forms, those entrusted 
with power have, in time, and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny . 
. . .”136 Our government was constructed partly with this maxim in mind, the 
better to guard against its seemingly inevitable end. But rather than trying to 
demand some form of respect through intimidation and increasingly brutal 
uniforms, respect might be generated through the officers’ actions. As 
peacekeepers and citizens themselves, police might have a care for the kind 
of country they are creating and whether they actually want to live in a 
nation where rural officers might walk around in full-body armor as if 
preparing for war. We are not citizens of a Detroit-dystopia. RoboCop looks 
cool, but we do not need him in our communities. 
C. Reliable Reporting for Injuries and Deaths Related to Police Interaction 
There is still a significant problem with police departments keeping 
reliable records and reporting police use of force, both in Seattle and 
nationally.137 Just having this kind of accountability might result in fewer 
incidences of abuse of force or death of citizens. However, currently, what 
amounts to “use of force” has no standard definition between one state and 
                                                                                                                              
136 Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to a Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 
in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., The Univ. 
of Chic. Press 2000) (1978), available at http://press-
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137 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 3, 15–16; see also Wesley Lowery, How 
Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), 
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another.138 Jurisdictions are also not required to keep records on how often 
use of force is implemented, or how many are shot or even die by police 
action.139 Instead, LEAs self-report.140 Of over 17,000 LEAs in the country, 
only around 750 (including Seattle) submit numbers, reporting 
approximately 400 “justifiable homicides” by police officers per year.141 In 
this context, “justifiable homicide” means the “killing of a felon by a law 
enforcement officer in the line of duty.”142 The term “justifiable homicide” 
is itself problematic as it presupposes first guilt and then conviction by 
referring to the deceased as a “felon.” This data set also does not include 
those killed who were not suspected felons and there is no listing for 
“unjustified homicide.”143 Meanwhile, the DOJ estimated the number of 
arrest-related deaths (for both alleged felonies and misdemeanors) at around 
800 or so per year, although the report ceased collecting data in 2009 
because the numbers were regarded as unreliable.144 In comparison, 
nationwide in 2013, felonious incidents resulted in the deaths of 27 police 
officers performing their duties; another 49 died through accidents, mainly 
                                                                                                                              
138 Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-
force/pages/welcome.aspx; Charles A. Gruber & Wayne W. Schmidt, Mandatory 
Nationwide Use of Force Reporting by Police and Correctional Agencies and Why This 
is an Important Issue, 6 AELE MO. L. J. 501, 502–04 (2015). 
139 Gruber, supra note 138; see also AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY FORCE: POLICE USE OF 
LETHAL FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2015), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/aiusa_deadlyforcereportjune2015.pdf. 
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owing to car crashes.145 Those numbers, reported to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), are presumably fairly accurate because the data is 
collected from several sources, including 
[c]ity, university and college, county, state, tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies participating in the Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program . . . [;] FBI field offices . . . [;] [and s]everal 
nonprofit organizations, such as the Concerns of Police Survivors 
and the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 
which provide various services to the families of fallen officers. . . 
. When the FBI receives notification of a line-of-duty death, the 
Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) 
Program’s staff works with FBI field offices to contact the fallen 
officer’s employing agency and request additional details about the 
fatal incident. The LEOKA staff also obtains criminal history data 
from the FBI’s Interstate Identification Index about individuals 
who are identified in connection with line-of-duty felonious 
deaths.146 
Essentially, the FBI seems go to some lengths to keep accurate reports on 
officer deaths, even with agencies that do not otherwise report.147 For non-
fatal police violence against citizens—or even narrowed strictly to how 
many people were shot by officers—no reliable or complete record 
exists.148 The Center for Disease Control has stated that for the years 1999–
2013, 6,338 people died due to “legal intervention,” but only 32 states 
participated.149 Other rough estimates given by independent groups are 
                                                                                                                              
145 FBI, OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2013/officers-feloniously-
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startlingly high.150 One source claims that in the first few months of 2015, 
police officers caused a death every eight hours, on average.151 Recent 
events have encouraged people to question why there have not been reliable 
efforts by the government to compile numbers even on officer-related 
homicides.152 This seems like a gross oversight and an enormous blind spot 
in our justice system that may contribute to the lack of police 
accountability. 
However, Seattle has taken several steps that other jurisdictions might 
emulate. SPD now keeps track of its use of force—in 2014, for the first 
time, it collected standardized force data for a continuous six-month 
period153—and it has begun releasing periodic reports on both the kind of 
force required as well as the precipitating events requiring such force.154 
SPD’s website has information available to citizens with internet access, 
including its police manual, several reports relating to its use of force, and 
an option for processing anonymous complaints online.155 The Office of 
Accountability (OPA), headed by a mayor-appointed civilian who is 
confirmed by the city council, oversees the complaints process.156 The OPA 
documents the complaints and classifies them either by whether a 
supervisor may address the complaint or whether a full misconduct 
                                                                                                                              
150 See Cassandra Fairbanks, Cops Have Killed Every 8 Hours in 2015, Sending At Least 
Three People to Early Graves Per Day, THE FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Feb. 16, 2015), 
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investigation is required.157 If the findings are “not sustained,” the OPA 
categorizes them as unfounded, lawful and proper, inconclusive, requiring a 
training referral, or requiring management action.158 Note that the final two 
categories still indicate that there was likely merit to the complaint.159 When 
a training referral is required, the officer’s actions are not cause for 
discipline because “while there may have been a violation of policy, it was 
not a willful violation and/or the violation did not amount to misconduct,” 
so training will suffice.160 When management action is required, no 
individual officer is considered at fault because something was deficient in 
SPD policy or procedure.161 Only sustained findings of misconduct, based 
on a preponderance of the evidence, then go to the chief of police for 
disciplinary action of an individual officer.162 The whole process takes 60–
180 days.163 
The transparency of the process and SPD’s inclusion of civilian oversight 
is a step in the right direction. SPD provides past OPA reports and 
encourages citizens filing complaints to disclose their identities so that they 
might receive notification regarding the status of the investigation as it 
unfolds.164 Seattle’s current OPA director, Pierce Murphy, considers the 
purpose of the OPA to answer the question “quis custodiet ipsos 
custodies?” or, “who guards the guardsman?”; he believes that the OPA 
functions as part of citizens’ First Amendment right to complain to the 
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government.165 However, there are still some lingering problems. For one 
thing, in Seattle, except for the OPA director, the auditor, and a civilian 
deputy director, the majority of OPA staff are cops.166 This can create 
something of both an image problem for complainants and a question of 
loyalties for the officers involved in any jurisdiction where this is true. 
Moreover, this process still seems to rely very heavily on internal police 
discretion after the OPA has made its determination.167 If the complaint is 
only classified under requiring supervisor action, the complaint might 
effectively disappear into a black hole wherein a supervisor merely has a 
conversation with the officer against whom the complaint was raised.168 The 
reporting process thus relies on both the discretion and the supervisory 
capacity of a superior who has already proved at least somewhat ineffective 
in managing subordinates, as evidenced by the fact the subordinate’s actions 
warranted a complaint.169 While it might prove effective in any individual 
instance and a supervisor could very well impress the seriousness of the 
situation on the officer, there is no systematic guarantee in the process. 
Even if SPD conducts a full misconduct investigation and the complaint 
sustained, this is not necessarily the end of the matter. The chief of police is 
the only one who can discipline the offending officer.170 Affording only the 
chief of police with disciplinary power might run into some of the same 
aforementioned issues.171 Moreover, the chief of police may choose to 
change a sustained finding to a not sustained finding if he or she writes a 
letter to the mayor and city council explaining his or her reasoning.172 The 
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chief of police does not have to write any such letter of explanation if 
findings remain sustained but the chief of police chooses not to follow the 
OPA’s recommended discipline.173 While some might argue that the chief 
of police is entitled to deference in the management of the police 
department, the OPA’s stated mission is to provide this kind of oversight 
and advance accountability and public awareness,174 which could in turn 
help create a transparent system promoting public confidence. If the final 
disciplinary measures are still ultimately under internal control and 
discretion, there is no guarantee that police will reform their behavior 
adequately to suit the public need for police accountability. 
Another wrinkle enters in when one considers the various protections in 
the system for the officer against whom a complaint was made. Before 
action is taken against an SPD officer on the basis of sustained findings, the 
officer in question is owed a due process hearing with the chief of police.175 
Even if the chief of police fully agrees with OPA’s sustained findings and 
even its discipline recommendation, the chief’s word is not necessarily 
final.176 After a discipline determination, the officer is also owed an appeals 
process.177 If appealed with the Discipline Review Board, the chief’s 
decision is reviewed by a three-panel board consisting of a police 
management representative (typically a captain or assistant chief), a 
representative from one of the police guilds, and one neutral third-party 
arbitrator.178 Essentially, the review comes from a board where the majority 
are cops.179 This board then has the power to overturn the chief’s discipline 
decision, reducing or eliminating it entirely, and it can even overturn the 
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original sustained findings.180 The city can still appeal the review board’s 
decision to the courts, but this option is often too costly to pursue.181 
A few easy solutions on how to handle police complaints seem to present 
themselves. Seattle, and other cities like it, could change some elements of 
their OPA. For instance, chiefs of police could be forced to make an 
accounting for why they might refuse to follow OPA discipline 
recommendations, similar to how they might need to explain their reasoning 
for reversing a sustained finding. This increases accountability, helps ensure 
deviations from OPA discipline recommendation are only done for good 
reason, could create greater faith in the complaints system from citizens 
who feel that proper civilian oversight is present, and overall might 
encourage chiefs to follow civilian oversight directions in discipline 
matters. The Seattle OPA director has also indicated that he thinks having 
more civilians working in the OPA as investigators might improve 
accountability and trust in the system.182 This could work in a few ways. 
While this might involve having to find money to pay for these new 
positions, they could possibly take the salaries currently paid to cops in the 
same position, or the department could enlist civilian volunteers. However, 
no matter the route taken, anyone allowed to work as an OPA investigator 
should probably be thoroughly vetted and qualified to hold the position. 
Moreover, it is likely unnecessary to eliminate officer presence in the OPA 
entirely, especially as they are likely to be both qualified and 
knowledgeable about various police procedures and can be a good source of 
information for the office. Other changes that might help the OPA process 
include overhauling the current discipline review process so that a police 
management representative and a police guild representative do not make 
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ultimate gatekeepers for police discipline. However, this might prove 
difficult if police guilds choose to resist the change. 
Another solution would be for Washington and other states to implement 
laws that would force officers to publicly account for every bullet they fire. 
While SPD’s use of force is now broadly documented, public access to 
records on when and how many shots are fired does not appear to be easily 
accessible.183 Bullets are likely be easily countable by how many have been 
requested and issued to each officer. If one bullet is fired at—or ends up 
in—a citizen, it would seemingly be a very simple task to report it and have 
those numbers available to the public in a database the same way as 
tracking officers killed in the line of duty or other crime reports are 
generated.184 While opponents might argue that a new database for bullets 
increases the amount of paperwork, much of the documentation is already 
required when officers write their incident reports. Adding a formal 
database just requires essentially generating a separate table. Moreover, a 
bullet inventory seems like a fairly important thing to keep track of. 
Similarly, Washington could require officers to report when an encounter 
with an officer results in a death. Although some LEAs do report use of 
force, this is at the LEAs’ discretion, not by state or federal mandate.185 At 
the federal level, the current “justifiable homicide” measurement used by 
the FBI is similarly self-reported at the participating LEAs’ discretion and 
still fails to account for deaths during the course of misdemeanors or 
accidental deaths.186 While there may be some murky areas where the actual 
matter is unclear—as when a suspect has a heart attack while police are in 
pursuit, or if a suspect is shot but dies weeks later—for the most part, 
knowing the cause of death also seems like it could be a fairly simple matter 
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involving a very basic understanding of causation. Requiring LEAs to 
report use of force, rather than permitting them to report at their discretion, 
seems like a reasonable step. 
Additionally, Washington could require reporting whenever the use of 
force extends to tools such as pepper spray, nightsticks, and other non-lethal 
uses of force, again emulating SPD. Such regulations might require almost 
entirely self-reporting methods and cannot be as accurately measured as 
bullets discharged, but, primarily, society would have to trust officers to 
largely be truthful in their reports. Having this kind of statistic could be 
enormously useful for the public to measure police use of force. 
There will still likely be some problems in reporting for all of these 
suggestions. If funding and public approval become tied to these numbers, 
LEAs might also feel pressure to be less accurate in their reporting. Even 
so, this would still produce more accurate numbers than we currently have. 
Moreover, it may influence some LEAs to use less force and have fewer 
fatal encounters to keep public opinion high. Given that SPD has already 
implemented many of these measures, it might be used as a model with a bit 
more reform, especially in how it implements discipline. The next section 
will address additional discipline concerns. 
D. Stricter Sanctions for Complaints of Excessive Force and Assault: 
Holding Officers Accountable for Public and Private Actions 
Police departments in general may also do a better job of “self-policing” 
when officers are faced with allegations of using excessive force against 
someone, either while on the job or in the offices’ private lives. SPD 
currently relies on a reporting process described in the last section that 
ultimately leaves the discretion of discipline in the hands of the chief of 
police.187 Departments could issue sanctions, suspend officers, dock pay, 
initiate transfers, or simply fire the officers, which are options SPD already 
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has at its disposal.188 However, these sanctions might need more rigorous 
enforcement and implementation by a body wholly outside the police force, 
possibly with a point system for more egregious complaints. 
One suggestion for a disciplinary mechanism is relying on a point 
system. For instance, each officer could receive 10 points for the entirety of 
his or her career with the department. Successive sustained complaints 
could result in greater sanctions by a pre-determined guideline, with the end 
being termination of employment. The system could admittedly create some 
unjust results based on an officer’s popularity, issues in the complaint 
process, or past mistakes. This new system might also suffer if it still relied 
on the current OPA complaint system to make a finding of a sustained 
complaint. There may be additional difficulties in implementation if the 
chief of police instead has discretion in this regard, as those in charge may 
want to protect their own. For this system to work, it may require 
eliminating discretion. 
Relying on a point system may ultimately seem like a drastic measure, 
but it may have to come to this to root out those “bad apples.” While one 
report stated that citizens felt that 9 out of 10 interactions with the police 
were proper, when force was used, the majority of respondents felt it was 
excessive.189 The DOJ found there was in fact a pattern or practice of 
unnecessary or excessive use of force in the case of SPD.190 It seems 
unlikely this policy change would result in much abuse from the public, as 
higher and unavoidable sanctions would likely impact police interactions 
with the public to cut down on the use of force altogether. Even now, with 
current use of force, less than seven complaints occur every year per 100 
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officers across the nation.191 Whether or not officers used force in any 
individual instance to the degree that it would result in criminal conviction 
or civil penalty, the public perception of abuse of power should still be 
persuasive to a police department that intends to make changes for the 
better, as SPD has committed to do. 
Accusations of use of force or assault should be taken just as seriously 
outside of the line of duty. The issue is not only the abuse of power while 
on the job, but also a pervasive problem with disregard to the rights and 
personal safety of others. Police departments should not employ officers 
who act in assaultive or aggressive ways in their private lives. 
Unfortunately, it seems that certain types of violence are common in the 
profession.192 It should be noted that “violence” is a general term, only a 
few studies on the matter exist, and figures come largely by self-report and 
not from how many charges or complaints have actually been filed against 
the officer.193 Accusations of violence in police officers’ private lives goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, violent tendencies as a whole are 
pertinent to the issue of excessive use of force while on duty. It seems it 
would be in a department’s best interest to use complaints of force and 
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assault while both on- and off-duty (as measured by whether it occurred in 
the context of the fulfilling job requirements) in their calculations when 
deciding to sanction or fire an officer. This may be of particular concern if 
an attitude of violence may be affecting decisions for official use of force. 
E. Body-Worn Videos: Watching the Watchmen 
Another strategy police could use to better protect citizens’ rights is to 
implement the use of body-worn video devices (BWVs). Placed on the 
officer’s clothing or sunglasses, these cameras provide both video and audio 
evidence of police-civilian interactions.194 They may be especially useful in 
the context of a protest, when events may be prone to confusion, when tear 
gas may have driven away reporters and others with recording devices, and 
where the police would presumably have some of the best vantage points to 
see events unfold at the ground level. Moreover, having so many police in a 
single place, all wearing the same equipment, would make the events 
documentable from multiple angles, making for a firm record of events. 
According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, jurisdictions 
that used BWVs “enhanced officer safety, improved agency accountability, 
and reduced agency liability” for the police department, while making 
officers more mindful of following protocols in line with citizens’ 
constitutional rights.195 Tamperproof BWVs worn on the officers’ persons 
could create greater accountability to the public, cut down on spurious 
claims of excessive use of force, and be useful evidence in the case of legal 
action as documentation of the officers’ procedures.196 
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Police forces have already successfully used BWVs. For instance, in the 
United Kingdom, BWVs allowed officers to record accurate evidence in 
real time, let the officers make quick records to resolve cases more rapidly, 
and gave detailed records when the investigation called for reviewing the 
officer’s actions.197 Here in the United States, hundreds of police 
departments, including Cincinnati, Ohio, and San Diego, California, have 
also purchased and used BWVs to some success.198 For the most part, the 
public seems in favor of the program, perhaps somewhat spurred by 
accusations of police brutality and excessive use of force.199 For instance, in 
Birmingham, citizen complaints have dropped 71 percent while their police 
department’s use of force has dropped 38 percent.200 Moreover, even human 
rights groups and government watch-dog websites seem in favor of BWVs 
as a method of guarding against government abuse, so long as the BWVs do 
not become just another method for routine government surveillance.201 
So far, SPD has issued around 12 BWVs to officers, and SPD is looking 
into how to blur the faces of those stored in its database to potentially 
protect the privacy of individuals.202 Officers volunteered to participate in 
the BWV Pilot Program.203 These volunteers completed SPD’s BWV 
training received checklists on pre-shift function checks on the cameras, 
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police activities to record, and reasons for which they might review the 
body-worn video.204 SPD also ordered them to continue recording until an 
event had concluded, to notify people they were being recorded “as soon as 
practical,” to document the existence of a video or lack thereof, to enter data 
for recorded events, and to upload the videos before the end of the shift.205 
Redacted videos recorded in phase 1 of the city’s plan are available 
online.206 Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole has publicly stated that 
“the jury’s out” on whether SPD will issue BWVs to all of its officers.207 
However, some sources indicate Chief O’Toole has since expressed support 
for “deployment of body-worn video cameras on every one of Seattle’s 
600+ patrol officers.”208 Pre-Ferguson, SPD held a meeting concerning 
police accountability and SPD seemed willing to entertain the idea of using 
BWVs if the privacy concerns were also considered.209 SPD has also voiced 
concerns about effective cost measurements and how to cope with the 
enormous amount of data from the cameras to be stored.210A full review on 
BWVs is expected sometime in the fall of 2015.211 
For BWVs to be effective, police departments need to consider when and 
how the cameras would function. The recordings would have to be both 
dependable and tamperproof to ensure their usefulness.212 One method for 
the recording procedure could be having officers turn on the cameras 
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whenever they interact with a civilian.213 However, it seems like this 
method would face some problems. Sometimes an officer may forget to 
trigger the camera’s use, either due to a memory lapse or in the heat of the 
moment. Valuable evidence—which could be used to prove or disprove a 
claim made regarding a police-citizen interaction—could be lost this way. 
An officer may also willfully refuse to turn on the BWV, despite 
regulations, and claim human error. Police departments may also claim the 
operator forgot to turn on the camera just to cover evidence if the video 
shows clearly erroneous conduct. While most police officers are law-
abiding citizens who would never do such a thing, making the video 
dependent on the officers’ initiation leaves the system open to these kinds 
of abuses.214 
Another method could be that the camera would turn on whenever an 
officer’s emergency equipment, such as lights or sirens, is activated, similar 
to how the camera on many TASER devices begins to record when it is 
released from its dock.215 However, this method also has its failings. If the 
camera were tied to the activation of the police car’s lights or sirens, there 
would be no recording in the case of a spontaneous emergency that begins 
outside the vehicle, as when an officer is having a face-to-face conversation 
with a person on the street. This system also fails to account for officers 
who do not have a police car. 
A preferred method might simply be to have the cameras operating from 
the moment the police officer puts on his or her uniform, uploading every 
recording either remotely or at the end of the officer’s shift in a main library 
at the department headquarters.216 This method will produce significantly 
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more data, but present technology seems capable of coping with the 
burden.217 
Requiring police departments to use BWVs could face some problems in 
implementation. Police have shown some resistance to what they see as an 
intrusion on their privacy rights.218 However, the benefits of BWVs seem to 
outweigh the costs. BWVs may help police-civilian interactions by 
increasing public trust in the legal system, giving an unbiased record of 
events to help support officers’ claims, making officers more mindful of the 
constitutional rights of the citizens they are interacting with, and putting 
everyone on their best behavior for the camera.219 According to one police 
chief, the “only officers who would have a problem with body cameras are 
bad officers.”220 
Opponents assert, however, that BWVs are simply not a good enough 
solution to the problem and that they might, at best, be considered a “Band-
Aid.”221 Even when an entire interaction between police and citizens is 
being recorded, many claim that the officers are not deterred from excessive 
use of force.222 On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner—an unarmed black man and 
a father of six—died while being held in a departmentally-prohibited 
chokehold by New York Police Department officers arresting him for 
allegedly selling “loose” (non-taxed) cigarettes.223 Mr. Garner’s last words, 
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repeated until his dying breath, were, “I can’t breathe. I can’t breathe.”224 A 
bystander recorded the entire incident and his death received national 
attention, and yet, even with the video, none of the officers involved in Mr. 
Garner’s homicide were indicted.225 The failure to even indict, while there 
is full video evidence of departmentally-prohibited conduct and a resultant 
death, gives credence to the argument that police behavior will not change 
just because they are being recorded. It indicates police might still be 
untouchable, and so there is no incentive to alter their behavior if they will 
never face punishment. As a counter to this, however, some of the officers 
involved might not have known they were being recorded. If officers had to 
wear BWVs and knew the camera was rolling, this still might be enough to 
convince at least some officers to scale back the use of force. 
Fear of increased government surveillance may be another source of 
resistance for using BWVs. This issue might best develop through case law, 
where courts can determine specific examples of how and where the 
surveillance intrudes on privacy rights. While having running cameras 
mounted on officers who may be interacting with people during very 
stressful, intimidating, or painful moments of citizens’ lives does raise 
privacy concerns, the protection of civil liberties by recording police 
interactions might be worth this somewhat lesser invasion.226 Moreover, the 
police need to interact with people while on duty, and BWVs are a way to 
keep an accurate record of that interaction. The privacy invasion could be 
minimized by limiting the cameras to uniformed police or have the police 
announce that their interaction is being recorded.227 SPD is considering 
requiring consent to record while inside a private area, and it is looking into 
ways to redact certain images and information.228 SPD has explored 
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redaction methods through blurring all of the images or using outlines.229 
While this may generate some censorship concerns, the primary interest 
seems to be in blurring or blocking faces to protect citizens’ identities.230 
There have also been suggestions that, unless the data is flagged, it should 
be deleted within a few weeks.231 There may be dangers associated with this 
proposal, however, as it might make it easier for police to fail to flag 
particularly incriminating evidence—as in the case of blatant brutality—and 
then claim there was an error. If anything, the sheer volume of data might 
be the best protection for citizens’ privacy, as it is unlikely that anyone 
would have the time or inclination to go through all of that voluminous 
data. At minimum, police departments should consider using BWVs during 
protests, where the public format should at least resolve some privacy 
concerns as citizens have a lowered expectation for privacy in such a 
context. Ultimately, where BWVs have been implemented, the benefits 
have the potential to outweigh the costs, although it might take some time to 
decide whether any protocols need to be changed.232 
Finally, some might argue the cost of implementing this plan is too large. 
The cost of a single BWV could range between $300 and $400, which could 
cause a large police department to go bankrupt.233 Storage costs for the data 
collected could also be a major issue, with one police department citing 
over a million dollars in estimated storage expenses.234 However, as noted 
previously, police departments have access to DoD equipment through very 
little effort, as well as large amounts of anti-terrorism funds through the 
Department of Homeland Security grants. Also, the unit cost of a single 
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M16 rifle, transferred from the DoD through the 1033 Program, is $499, 
which the police department has nonetheless abundantly invested.235 
Moreover, the cost per camera might decrease if BWVs were more 
prevalent because they would have to be mass-produced, which would drive 
down the costs. Some of the storage expenses could also be alleviated by 
looking to other methods of storage or by developing a procedure for 
deleting unnecessary footage after some period. Alternatively, departments 
might alleviate some of the financial burden if only certain officers wore 
BWVs, or if officers only wore them during protests. Also, litigation costs 
might decrease with BWV evidence by spurring more settlements or simply 
dropping clearly spurious claims, so the money saved might account for the 
cameras’ purchase.236 Lastly, President Obama recently announced a plan to 
expend $75 million to equip 50,000 police officers nationwide with BWVs, 
with the intention of creating a $265 million three-year initiative focusing 
on police training and reform.237 This program is supposed to be included in 
the 2015 budget, with an ultimate goal of providing a 50 percent federal 
match for any department buying BWVs.238 Therefore, even if cost is an 
issue, LEAs that are unable or unwilling to equip themselves with BWVs 
may nonetheless be provided with the cameras. 
F. Banning or Limiting Washington Police Departments’ Ownership of 
Assaultive Military-Grade Weaponry 
Washington State could also simply ban or severely limit LEA ownership 
of military-grade weaponry. One of the largest outcries against the current 
interaction between police and protesters has been police using military-
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grade weapons and equipment during protests, such as tanks, armored 
trucks, and full-body armor.239 Reportedly, President Obama is currently 
working on an executive order addressing review and supervision standards 
for acquiring military-grade equipment.240 The United States House of 
Representatives recently proposed the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement 
Act, which would largely dismantle the current 1033 Program and decrease 
funding offered by Homeland Security, making it much more difficult for 
police departments to acquire military-grade weapons.241 According to Raúl 
Labrador, who co-wrote the bill, “Our nation was founded on the principle 
of a clear line between the military and civilian policing . . . . The 
Pentagon’s current surplus property program blurs that line by introducing a 
military model of overwhelming force in our cities and towns.”242 If 
successful, the Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act would require LEAs 
to certify that they have the personnel, technical capacity, and training to 
operate the property, that they will return the surplus property if the need 
for it has passed, that they will not transfer certain types of equipment from 
one federal or state agency to another, that they will maintain a website with 
a description of the transferred equipment, and that they will alert local 
communities to the property requests.243 The act would also bar LEAs from 
using certain types of equipment, “including high-caliber weapons, sound 
cannons, grenades, grenade launchers and certain armored vehicles.”244 
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While it seems unlikely the proposed bill will succeed in the House, after 
the events in Ferguson, Missouri, President Obama has still ordered a 
review of federal programs—like the 1033 Program—which provide LEAs 
with military-grade weapons.245 The review, reportedly, will look not only 
to whether this type of equipment should be given to local law enforcement 
at all, but also look to whether the LEAs have been trained in the safety, 
use, and maintenance of the equipment.246 
Washington could propose its own legislation to much the same effect. 
Like the proposed act, Washington could bar LEAs from requesting certain 
transfers from the DoD. For the most part, high-caliber weapons, armored 
vehicles, and all types of grenades seem largely excessive for local law 
enforcement. Washington could also put a monetary limit on how much 
funding local and state LEAs may accept from the federal government, 
capping it using an algorithm of need as based on the population the LEA 
serves. However, it should be noted that the 1033 Program is still a useful 
resource for local police with legitimate and helpful purposes. Its use should 
continue in a limited manner. For instance, it seems reasonable that LEAs 
continue to be able to requisition DoD property like computers, office 
supplies, BWVs, and other non-combat-related surplus equipment.247 While 
police departments may need some combat equipment, it seems reasonable 
that the kind and expense of such possessions should be proportional to the 
particular agency’s budget as determined by local taxes. 
This proposal might face several critiques. Police departments will be 
loath to give up their federal money or military-grade equipment in any 
capacity, if the rampant stockpiling has been any indication.248 Moreover, 
one could argue that the funding and equipment help the police perform 
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their jobs more efficiently and safely without overburdening the citizens in 
their locality. The reduction of crime should be a priority, and police should 
have the funds to accomplish this task. However, it appears that the tie to 
federal funds or equipment might have nothing to do with protecting 
citizens from crime, “and in fact, successfully fighting crime could hurt a 
department’s ability to rake in federal money,” because grants are more 
likely to go to high-crime areas.249 Ultimately, law enforcement is becoming 
a business where the end is to acquire more funding to hire more personnel, 
acquire better equipment, and conduct more raids and crack-downs for 
(usually minor or drug-related) offenses.250 The protection of citizens seems 
to have very little to do with it. Sense seems to have very little to do with it. 
G. Limiting the Accepted Methods of Non-lethal Crowd Control 
Finally, police departments could limit the accepted methods of non-
lethal crowd control altogether. SPD has taken steps in the right direction by 
clearly outlining specific policies for its force tools, such as beanbag 
shotguns and canine deployment, but reform is still necessary at both a local 
and national scale.251 In particular, police departments should discontinue 
using chemical agents such as tear gas and pepper spray. Tear gas may 
contain either the chemical chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) or 
chloroacetophenone (CN, sometimes referred to as “mace”), while pepper 
spray often contains chili peppers mixed with corn oil.252 Both tear gas and 
pepper spray are part of a class of chemical weapons in the category of 
lachrymatory agents, and in fact, the same company usually makes them 
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and sometimes even combines them into the same product.253 The term 
“non-lethal” relates to the intent for use; tear gas is not meant to kill those 
afflicted with it as it is “generally considered to have only short term 
consequences.”254 This does not mean that tear gas is incapable of killing.255 
Although the purpose of tear gas and pepper spray is only to activate pain-
sensing nerves by irritating mucus membranes, the health effects of tear gas 
may be long-reaching and severe, including pulmonary concerns, as well as 
damage to the eyes, heart, and other organs, with some populations being 
more at risk than others.256 In some cases, tear gas exposure causes 
miscarriages, and tear gas canister explosions result in amputations.257 
Moreover, the international community has largely condemned tear gas as 
inhumane, and the Chemical Weapons Convention has banned it during 
wartimes.258 
Technological developments continue to provide more humane 
alternatives for non-lethal force. For instance, conductive energy devices 
(CEDs) such as TASERs have become more commonly used in the United 
States, with over 140,000 units issued across the country.259 Although CEDs 
have also faced criticism for potential health risks due to fatalities, creators 
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of this technology are still developing it and seeking safer non-lethal 
methods to subdue suspects.260 Also, CEDs are more effective against single 
perpetrators and cannot be used by police officers to indiscriminately 
blanket a crowd. While officers may need to control crowds at times, CEDs 
could enable them to use force on a few unruly individuals early on without 
affecting peaceful protestors as well. 
Opponents might argue that these aggressive forms of crowd control are 
necessary to keep order and make sure police officers are safe. However, 
police officers’ jobs are actually already fairly safe and are getting safer.261 
The homicide rate for police officers in 2010 was 7.9 per 100,000 officers, 
and “2012 was the safest year for police officers since the 1950s.”262 
Reportedly, 2013 saw the fewest officers killed by firearms since 1887, and 
was again the lowest year for police fatalities since 1959.263  Also in 2013, 
the last year the FBI compiled data as of the time of this writing, 76 officers 
died in line-of-duty events, and only 27 of those deaths were the result of 
felonious acts; the rest were accidents.264 For any given year, it is estimated 
that citizens will feloniously kill between 9 and 12 per 100,000 officers.265 
Admittedly, this national average is higher than the homicide rate of Seattle 
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in 2012 (2.3 per 100,000 people).266 However, this is drastically lower than 
the homicide rate in 2010 for cities like St. Louis (40.5 per 100,000 people), 
Kansas City (21.1 per 100,000 people), or Atlanta (17.3 per 100,000 
people).267 A person is “more likely to be murdered just by living in these 
cities than the average American police officer is to be murdered on the 
job.”268 In terms of professions, in 2014, loggers had a fatality rate of 
around 109.5 per 100,000 full-time workers, followed by fishers and related 
fish workers at 80.9 per 100,000 full-time workers, pilots and flight 
engineers at 63.2 per 100,000 full-time workers, and roofers are at 46.2 per 
100,000 full-time workers.269 Police officers did not even make the top-ten 
list.270 It is unclear why this might be; although it is possible that police 
militarization itself may be why officers are safer; at this point, that is 
merely a correlation and pure speculation. In either case, currently there is 
little evidence indicating that police officers are justified in using this level 
of force indiscriminately against a crowd just to keep police safe. 
Even if police officers still need access to non-lethal weapons usable 
against whole crowds at once, there are still alternatives to chemical 
warfare. Although the FBI reports that violent crime is the lowest it has 
been since the 1970s,271 arguably there are times when a crowd requires 
dispersal not only for the officers’ safety, but also for the safety of citizens 
and property. In these instances, police might still use devices like the Long 
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Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) “sound cannon,” which broadcasts 
“deterrent” tones that can transmit 162 dB from five-and-a-half miles 
away.272 For reference, humans experience discomfort in decibel ranges 
around 120 dB, with hearing loss possible around the 130 dB-level.273 As 
such, sounds at this level can be painful and headache inducing, and with 
misuse or abuse, LRADs may cause permanent hearing loss.274 Based on a 
few comments by Police Chief O’Toole, this is not currently a favored 
method for SPD.275 The LRADs themselves can cost from $5,000 to almost 
$190,000 each.276 Moreover, just based on their design, LRADs and their 
ilk are indiscriminate for use against both peaceful and rowdy protestors, 
potentially dissuading all forms of protest. However, it still might be 
preferable to assault protestors with sound waves than to damage life-
sustaining organs, as occurs when one is affected by tear gas. A lifelong 
disability is a severe risk, and there may be a danger for abuse, but at least 
vital organs like the heart and lungs are not being specifically targeted. 
Devices like the LRAD “sound cannon” are still far from perfect, but they 
seem like a step in the right direction, and the development of better and 
safer technology in a similar vein would likely pick up by a ban on 
chemical agents. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The extensive militarization of our local and state police forces poses a 
very real and cognizable threat to citizens’ civil liberties. In the context of 
peaceful protest, police militarization primarily presents itself as overblown 
and unnecessary, while also showing just how easy abuse can be with this 
amount of power. The stress of a military-like scheme that puts the police 
force in the mind of “warriors,” rather than as peacekeepers or guardians of 
the people, sets police and citizens as opponents and makes civilians into 
“the enemy.” The ultra-authoritarian viewpoint polarizes police and 
civilians, and those attracted to police work in this climate begin to see any 
act or stand against the affiliated government as a threat to the officers’ 
(citizen-granted) authority. As such, the climate for clashes and danger for 
abuse is never higher than during times of protest. Having taken the script 
from the WTO protests, the modern police force—and SPD as an example 
of both its problems and its possibility for reform—has chosen to take the 
path towards control rather than the path towards safeguarding the rights of 
protestors to gather peacefully in dramatic demonstrations against a 
government action, little realizing that “[t]here is no final one; revolutions 
are infinite.”277 Denied their rights to peacefully protest, a desperate people 
will still always find a way be heard, often not so peacefully. 
This is a nation-wide issue, but change needs to initiate at a local level. If 
SPD has a real commitment to change, to eliminate accusations of patterns 
of abuse, and especially to protect the people’s rights during protest, the 
police can make several changes relating to how they interact with the 
public, manage their own personnel, and increase accountability for their 
actions. With only a few changes, such as switching the uniform color, 
using BWVs, changing the discipline process, and banning tear gas, SPD 
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can once again be a model to the nation, this time for the proper way to 
manage a police force in answer to protest. 
The right of the masses to speak in a public format to express their 
dissatisfaction is a critical liberty that requires safeguarding. It is a staple of 
our nation’s political process, and a right rooted in the very start of our 
nation. The militarization of the police and the propagated policies that 
inevitably lead to clashes with these armored, battle-dressed pseudo-soldiers 
in city streets acts as a direct damper to that sentiment. The people have the 
right to a public voice to express political satisfaction, and by keeping that 
combat-boot firmly stamped on the faces of protestors, we risk the 
possibility of silencing that voice forever. 
 
